The present article deals with introducing and critically studying the book Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science by Daniel Garber. Garber, one of the most prominent researchers of modern Philosophy and contemporary Descartes-scholar, wrote the book in 1980, and it was published by Cambridge University Press. This work has been released in French, yet there is no Persian translation available. It is a collection of articles written separately by author and published in credible philosophical journals. The unifying subject of the articles is the relationship between Descartes’ philosophical and scientific areas of interest. This article intends to introduce the author and covers the literary style of the book in English in brief. The article mainly addresses the introduction and critical analysis of the book itself, in two parts successively: form and content. This article intends to introduce the author and covers the literary style of the book in English in brief. The article mainly addresses the introduction and critical analysis of the book itself, in two parts successively: form and content.

Our analysis of Popper’s Philosophy of Science focuses on his concepts of tradition and situational analysis. These concepts represent innovative Popperian contributions to a historical and hermeneutical turn in Philosophy of Science that most of his critics, especially Kuhn, fail to recognize. According to his historical view, Popper conceives Sciences as a complex of traditions in continuous transformation and progress by means of rational discussion of theories. In order to grasp the rational progress of scientific traditions, Popper proposes an original method that he calls “situational analysis”. This hermeneutical method seeks to understand the concepts, hypotheses, actions, practices, controversies and products that scientists made to solve problems in their specific historical contexts to improve the truth content of theories. In addition to his historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also inquired about the social and political conditions for the progress of scientific traditions by means of intersubjective criticism of theories and conjectures. According to him, the rational discussion of ideas requires, as necessary conditions, plurality of ideas, intellectual humility, and freedom of thought and communication that can only exist in an open and democratic society. With these considerations, we may say that in addition to a historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also contributed to a social and political turn in the Philosophy of Science

Heidegger's Philosophy of Science is controversial. Some regard him as a realist. One of their reasons is that in his view the subject matter of Science is independent from scientific methods. And others regard him as a relativist. That is because, as they state, Science is only possible in some general horizon of every period. Some see agreement between the first and the second Heidegger's Philosophy of Science, because they consider him to be a realist or a relativist throughout. And others see difference between them, for example, because he first stressed on "deworlding" and then denied that. Some claim for different reasons that what Thomas Kuhn called "paradigm," "normal Science," and "scientific revolution" in his Philosophy of Science had been introduced by Heidegger, and others disagree with such claims. In this paper, we explain and analyze the views of five scholars about these topics.

In Islamic Philosophy, as much as get away from ontology and get over to epistemology, gradually get away from Plato and Plotinus and it have inclined to Aristotelian realism and intellectualism. Aristotelian Philosophy of Science and, with follow that, Islamic Philosophy of Science have accepted three principal (1) being Science of metaphysics, (2) being essences and essential properties, (3) necessity of realistic analyses from essences and essential properties. But, Philosophy of Sciences after from Newton, gradually, have denied all of that three. New essentialism is to agree with greater of fundamental principles of Aristotelian essentialism, but they weakness that we can with their inspection to pace toward Philosophy of Science that we can call Islamic Philosophy of Science.The difference of these watchtowers is in difference of those metaphysics. And I find promoted metaphysics of Islamic Philosophy more realistic and more intellectual from metaphysics of meta-Newton(Human metaphysics), and I find epistemology and methodology of contemporary Islamic Philosophy of Science more realistic and more intellectual from epistemology and methodology of philosophies and contemporary Philosophy of Sciences, and even more realistic and more intellectual from epistemology and methodology of new essentialism

In the middle of sixteenth century, publishing of Copernicus' On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres led to the Copernican scientific revolution. This movement continued by publishing of Kepler's and Galileo's works in the early of seventeenth century. According to the common construal, in this methodological revolution, deduction is replaced by induction. In traditional Science, a few universal propositions possessed the main value and a vast collection of particular propositions were derived from them. This path in conversed in modern Science and few general laws acquire their validity from sets of particular propositions. In other words, particular experimental propositions have essential validity and general laws gain their value in a derived way. After this methodological revolution in Science, important transitions occurred in the political Philosophy. The thesis of this paper is that these transitions are affected by the mentioned changes in the Philosophy if Science.

In recent decades, rationality has become one of the important and controversial issues in the intellectual circles. There are many philosophers who have put (and still put) under question the status of reason and human rationality. Among those who believe in human reason is Popper. To show reason's ability, he rejects positivism and justifying approaches totally; and, designing falsificationist Philosophy of Science, he confirms critical rationality and attaches emphasis to it. In the present article, at first, Popper's rationality together with its important and constructive elements are inferred and reconstructed and, then, success and consistence of Popper's positions are studied and assessed. The main conclusion of the present article is that it is impossible to completely reject positivist and justifying approaches and provide an absolutely negativist and critical epistemology.

As an independent, serious, and powerful field of human knowledge, till the 1970's, sociology of Science was not so paid attention to in philosophers' debates. Early in 1970's however, many philosophers approached to this field of human knowledge in various ways. Since then, great advances and important developments have been made in this field. That is why the present article focuses on the sociology of Science and tries to represent its main components, building blocks, representatives, and main works done in this field during recent centuries. Sociology of Science is a field which has begun to make important exchanges with Philosophy. Some issues introduced in the sociology of Science have been at stake in the history of Science as well. Sociology of Science or, to put it more accurately, sociology of human knowledge, however, claims to be a substitute discipline for Philosophy of Science.The main claim posed in the present article is that what causes scientific events to occur- what causes people to believe some theory instead of some other theory-is actions and reactions of social forces. Science is a social action, and in no era it is relied on individual achievements of scientists. It is not isolated scientists who cause emergence of new eras in Science; but rather, scientists are themselves products of debates, resolution of differences, hierarchies, inequalities in power, and other social factors. It goes without saying that emphasis attached to social aspects of Science and ignoring the impact of the real structure of the world will be followed by many extremist consequences. In the present article, only main issues in sociology of Science will be described; critique of this discipline, however, needs to be made in another article.